

Striving for Victory on the Cheap: Imposing Democracy in the Absence of Total War

**A Monograph
by
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Abstract

Striving for Victory on the Cheap: Imposing Democracy in the Absence of Total War by LTC Henry A. Arnold, U.S. Army, Infantry, 55 pages.

Can the United States successfully impose democracy by force without resorting to the same level of total warfare it waged on Germany and Japan in the Second World War? The hypothesis for this research is that the U.S. can successfully force democracy on an undemocratic state without resorting to total war, but it can only do so through a comprehensive plan that includes the coordinated and integrated application of all instruments of national power and influence. This is an important question for operational and strategic planners and policy makers, because the United States has embarked on a series of actions since the Second World War to impose democracy by force, but has been reluctant to wage total war in order to achieve that goal.

The evaluation criteria for this research are drawn from two main sources. The first source is Dr. Eva Bellin's article in *Political Science Quarterly* (Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005) titled "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative historical Perspective." In that article, she posits seven factors that significantly contributed to the success the U.S. experienced with Japan and Germany: Economic development, ethnic homogeneity, effective state institutions, prior experience with meaningful democracy, leaders of national stature capable of sponsoring the democratic process, the psychology of utter defeat as a result of total war, and the level of commitment by the U.S. in terms of money, manpower and diplomacy.¹ The second source for the evaluation criteria is the Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) *Winning The Peace: An American Strategy for Post conflict Reconstruction*, edited by Robert C. Orr, in which Orr posits four "pillars" for successful post conflict reconstruction: security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation.² Combining elements of the two sources produces the evaluation criteria for this monograph. Those elements are security, the level of U.S. commitment, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and the psychology of defeat.

The research studies U.S. efforts in post World War II Germany and Japan, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and the recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The study screens and evaluates each of the case studies against the research criteria. However, the research for this study shows that security is not merely one of several pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. Security is actually the *foundation* for the post-conflict reconstruction effort upon which all other pillars must anchor in order to have success. All other elements of the evaluation criteria are necessary for success in imposing democracy, but they are not sufficient. Only security is the element that is both necessary *and* sufficient. The concluding analysis of the case studies during the research finds that the U.S. can impose democracy in the absence of total war, but it can only do so by committing the resources necessary to establish the foundation of a secure post-conflict environment that enables reconstruction and transformation.

¹ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 596-602.

² Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 10-11.

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INTRODUCTION

Can the United States successfully impose democracy by force without resorting to the same level of total warfare it waged on Germany and Japan in the Second World War? This is an important question for operational and strategic planners and policy makers, because the United States has embarked on a series of actions since the Second World War to impose democracy by force, but has been reluctant to wage total war in order to achieve that goal. This decision to impose democracy through limited means has produced inconsistent results, and the most recent attempts to do so in Afghanistan and Iraq have continued to expend American blood and treasure, overextend its armed forces, and occupy domestic and foreign politics and policies. More U.S. attempts to impose democracy by force are certainly on the horizon, because the spread of democracy is one of the key elements of our National Security Strategy:

“We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it....(the United States must) expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy....Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability...and extending peace and prosperity”³

This Wilsonian belief is clearly borne out of the concept that democratic nations do not wage war against each other, and that democracy automatically promotes social, economic, and political development and prosperity. As a result, the spread of democracy has become one of the pillars of our National Security Strategy. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder concisely articulate this key element of U.S. strategy and policy in the opening chapter of their book, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*: “No mature democracies have ever fought a war against each other. Consequently, conventional wisdom holds that promoting the spread of democracy will promote world peace and security.”⁴

³ United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, March, 2006), 1-3.

⁴ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go To War*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 1. Although there are plenty of theorists, social scientists, and the like (Packenham and Fukuyama for instance) who find serious fault with this line of reasoning

In spite of the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001 that claimed over 3,000 lives (more than were killed at Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941), the U.S. has continued to demonstrate a reluctance to wage total war to force the democratization of undemocratic and unfriendly states.⁵ The desire to wage war in the absence of total war requires the same level of detailed post conflict or “Phase IV” planning and effort as total war. It also requires an even greater degree of fidelity in the integration and application of all the instruments of national power and influence. The integration and application of all elements of national power and influence beyond pure military means is absolutely critical in setting conditions for successful forced democratization in the absence of the physical and psychological advantages (albeit potentially unacceptable on moral grounds since the end of World War II) gained by waging total war.

Recently, the United States has attempted to force the democratization of Afghanistan and Iraq without waging total war, and both endeavors have degenerated into consuming counter-insurgency wars. The intense insurgencies in both countries seem to indicate a lack of success at attempting to impose democracy. Both endeavors continue to significantly occupy the U.S., and although it is impossible to declare that the U.S. has failed in Iraq and Afghanistan at this point, it is also impossible for the U.S. to declare victory. This monograph hypothesizes that the U.S. can successfully force democracy on an undemocratic state without resorting to total war, but it can only do so through a comprehensive plan that includes the coordinated and integrated application of all instruments of national power and influence.

because it oversimplifies complex cultural and societal realities in many underdeveloped nations (the “targets” of our National Security Strategy), this monograph will not address them. The debate over the concept that democracy and free markets in underdeveloped countries are interrelated could conceivably constitute a separate monograph itself. Right or wrong, this concept remains one of the key “pillars” of the National Security Strategy.

⁵ Recall the President’s message to the American people following the terrorist attacks of “9/11” in which they were informed that no sacrifice for the “long war” would be expected of them other than to shop and travel. This theme was initially delivered during his address to the joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, and then reinforced during his televised news conference on 11 October 2001. The U.S. did not and has not mobilized its manpower or industry to wage war against a stated threat to its national security.

Total war has varied meanings to different people and countries. This monograph will use the example of the United States during the Second World War to define total war. During that war, the U.S. mobilized the entire nation to fight: the population, industry, the economy, agriculture, diplomacy, and information (entertainment and propaganda). The mobilization included significant changes in the social fabric of the nation (millions of American men in uniform, women required to work in traditional male jobs to support the war effort, rationing) as well as the curtailment of certain freedoms (the internment of Japanese-Americans – U.S. citizens – for example). This mobilized capability and might was then turned against Germany and Japan as the U.S. attacked every aspect, to include population centers, of those countries' capability to wage war. The result was that both nations were utterly destroyed in defeat, and their populations left with little choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the U.S. and the victorious Allies. Their means to fight was eliminated, and their will to continue to fight significantly diminished.⁶ Total war is not just the “ways” to provide an “end,” it is also the act of providing the necessary means.

The definition of a democratic state for this monograph comes from the definition provided in the National Security Strategy. It states that:

“Effective democracies honor and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press; are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government; exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law and resist corruption, and limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent business, and a market economy.”⁷

⁶ Japanese will to continue to fight long after they clearly had lost the means to do so was much higher than that of the Germans. Their will to continue to fight was only destroyed after the Emperor instructed them to accept defeat and “endure the unendurable.” With the exception of soldiers in isolated outposts across the Japanese Empire, it was an order they immediately and willingly obeyed. However, the Emperor’s decision to inform his people they were defeated and their willingness to accept the reality of their defeat was directly influenced by the destruction inflicted as a result of total war.

⁷United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, March, 2006), 6. Curiously, some of our key “allies” in the GWOT do not fit this description.

The concept of forced or imposed democratization requires some defining here too. A country can achieve democracy from within through peaceful evolution, or through violence in the form of revolution or insurgency. Powerful democracies such as the United States can assist in this process, and there are historical examples. Our support of the Nicaraguan Contras is a good example of supporting an internal struggle to achieve democracy without directly intervening with our own military to impose democracy. Such support to assist nations achieve democracy from within is also clearly a stated objective in our National Security Strategy. Democracy can also be imposed on a country from an external source through defeat and occupation. Post World War II Germany and Japan are good examples. The research for this study does not focus on democracy achieved through internal means – regardless of the amount of external support received from the U.S.⁸ The focus of this study is on U.S. actions to force the democratization of undemocratic nations from World War II to the present through use of it's military to defeat, occupy, and impose democracy on a given nation. The research for this study uses post-World War II Germany and Japan as models for successful forced democracy. In both cases, the majority of the people of those countries embraced a democratic form of government, and democracy has endured. Additionally, neither country experienced an armed resistance or insurgency against occupation and the transition to democracy.⁹

Many people make references to instruments or elements of national power when speaking or writing on the subject or related topics concerning how a nation influences other nations or regions or imposes its will. The research for this study refers to Joint doctrine for the definition of the instruments of national power and influence. *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, dated 14 November 2000 refers to four basic

⁸ Our assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua as an example.

⁹ Germany did experience a few early isolated incidents by the *Werwolfs* in 1945, but that movement died out quickly with very little impact on occupation and almost no support from the German population. The majority of post-war violence in Japan was due to criminal activity and not part of any organized resistance.

instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.¹⁰ These instruments and their definitions, as provided in U.S. joint doctrine, serve as the basis for definition of national power and influence for this monograph. Joint doctrine refers to the instruments of national power as “tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power; including its human potential, economy, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, and national will.”¹¹ The definitions of these instruments of national power are below.

The diplomatic instrument of national power is defined as “accomplishing engagement with other states and foreign groups in order to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives.”¹² This includes influencing friendly governments to join coalitions, provide material and financial support or country access, provide moral support in the form of their strategic communication in support of U.S. actions, and to vote in support of U.S. interests in the United Nations (UN). Diplomacy can also be used to dissuade nations disinclined to support U.S. from supporting the other side of the issue or disrupting U.S. efforts through the UN or through their own diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.¹³

The informational instrument of national power is defined as “a diffuse and complex set of components...a strategic resource vital to national security... (consisting of) information and information-based technologies...influences domestic and foreign audiences including citizens, adversaries, and governments.”¹⁴ The informational instrument of national power truly is dynamic, and has several key facets. It can be strategic communication by the U.S. to inform its citizens or to influence citizens of other countries.¹⁵ It is the gathering of and dissemination of

¹⁰The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000), v. These elements of national power are commonly grouped under the acronym “DIME” in military parlance.

¹¹ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000), I-6

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000), I-7.

¹⁵ Propaganda is clearly an element of “information operations” that would conceivably fall under the informational instrument of national power. Many nations use propaganda, and the U.S. certainly used it

actual information that can be analyzed and turned into intelligence. The informational instrument of national power also includes the ability of the U.S. to attack another nation's ability to communicate or use information-based technologies.¹⁶

Joint Publication 1 defines the military instrument of national power as the Armed Forces of the United States and it is inclusive of all capabilities of the Department of defense.¹⁷

The economic instrument of national power is defined as:

“Economic and trade relationships worldwide that promote U.S. fundamental objectives, such as promoting general welfare and supporting security interests and objectives. A strong domestic U.S. economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the guarantor of a strong national defense, and an influence for economic expansion by U.S. trade partners worldwide.”¹⁸

For the purposes of this study the economic instrument of national power includes the financial power of the U.S. as well. This study considers the ability of the U.S. to maintain a strong military with global reach, influence people and governments around the world through economic and financial aid and support as an integral aspect of the U.S. economic instrument of national power. Many leaders who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq have been repeatedly quoted as to the absolute criticality of money in those environments. The ability to disperse funds for reconstruction and stability by local leaders and commanders is often touted as being inexorably linked to force protection and equally important as ammunition. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus put it this way: “In an endeavor like Iraq, money is ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than real ammunition.”¹⁹ Various

during World War II. However, U.S. laws since that war restrict and, in most cases, prohibit the use of propaganda by the U.S.. The debate over the relative merits and evils of propaganda by the U.S., particularly when engaged in a so-called “Long War,” is a good one but could conceivably constitute an entire monograph on its own. The mention of propaganda in this monograph will be restricted to this footnote.

¹⁶ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000), I-7.

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ LTG David H. Petraeus., *Observations From Soldiering in Iraq*, (Military Review, January-February 2006), 4.

elements of the government and private sector control the instruments of national power. In order to effectively wield all the instruments of national power and influence successfully, all elements of the government and the private sector that control those instruments must be included in the planning and execution of any national attempt to impose U.S. will abroad.

One of the elements of the hypothesis for this monograph is “comprehensive planning.” Joint doctrine refers to a theater strategy as “the art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater.”²⁰ Our joint doctrine also espouses the concept of “unified action,” defined as the integrated and synchronized activities of military forces and nonmilitary organizations, agencies, and corporations to achieve common objectives”²¹ A final element of joint doctrine that defines comprehensive planning is the figure below from *Joint Publication 3.0: Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006.²² The figure denotes the five general phases of operations. Only phase III of this model is concerned primarily with traditional “kinetic” war fighting associated with destroying or defeating another military. Phases 0 through II are concerned with prevention, analysis, diplomacy, and potentially setting

²⁰ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 5.0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 13 April 1995), GL-12.

²¹ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3.0: Joint Operations*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 17 September 2006), II-3.

²² Ibid, IV-27.




Figure IV-7. Phasing Model

conditions for eventual “Phase III” operations. Phases IV and V are concerned with all actions required – using all instruments of national power – for turning the military successes on the battlefield during Phase III into strategic victory.²³

Our doctrine has evolved to reflect the understanding that there is no such thing as a “military solution” to any crisis. Comprehensive planning includes the detailed analysis of a given problem, to include the cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, and historical aspects as well as the traditional political, geographical, military, climate, and weather aspects of a given problem. Comprehensive planning also includes the detailed and continuous integration of all instruments of national power during planning and execution. Moreover, comprehensive planning

²³ Some military and civilian planners and leaders philosophically understand that Phase III and Phase IV may actually occur near simultaneously rather than sequentially, and that planners must account for this phenomenon to avoid gaps in effectiveness. This was certainly the case in Germany during the Second World War as Allied forces occupied parts of Germany before the official capitulation, and the Allies were able to initiate “Phase IV” activities before “Phase III” was complete. This was also the experience and observation of the author in Iraq in 2003, except that the lesson was lost since 1945 and there was a significant gap between the end of Phase III and the beginning of Phase IV. This was not due to a tactical error, but was a failure on the part of leaders and planners at the operational-strategic level.

must place an equal or greater emphasis on the phases to the left and right of Phase III to “win the peace” through strategic victory.²⁴

The evaluation criteria we will apply to case studies in this monograph will help to determine the feasibility of imposing democracy on a nation by force during Phase IV operations in the absence of total war during Phase III of the campaign. The evaluation criteria for this monograph are drawn from two main sources. The first source is Dr. Eva Bellin’s article in *Political Science Quarterly* (Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005) titled “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative historical Perspective.” In that article, she posits seven factors that significantly contributed to the success the U.S. experienced with Japan and Germany: Economic development, ethnic homogeneity, effective state institutions, prior experience with meaningful democracy, leaders of national stature capable of sponsoring the democratic process, the psychology of utter defeat as a result of total war, and the level of commitment by the U.S. in terms of money, manpower and diplomacy.²⁵ The second source for the evaluation criteria is the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) *Winning The Peace: An American Strategy for Post conflict Reconstruction*, edited by Robert C. Orr, in which Orr posits four “pillars” for successful post conflict reconstruction: security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation.²⁶ Combining elements of the two sources produces the evaluation criteria for this monograph. Those elements are security, the level of U.S. commitment, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and the psychology of defeat. Each of the elements of the criteria is briefly explained below.

²⁴ DoD directive 3000.05, dated 28 November 2005, specifically states that military support to and for Stability, Support, Transition, and Reconstruction operations (SSTR - “Phase IV” operations) is a key function of U.S. military forces, and directs all branches of the military (within DoD) to give equal attention and energy to the planning and preparation for SSTR as they have traditionally applied to kinetic warfighting operations (“Phase III” operations).

²⁵ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 596-602.

²⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 10-11.

Security is recognized as the most important element of the evaluation criteria, because it is almost impossible to accomplish anything without a secure environment. Orr's definition states that security "addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions...it is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars (of reconstruction)."²⁷ Security is not just the presence of military, paramilitary, and police forces. Those forces must actually deliver security, and the people must *feel* secure. Security allows the government to function, it allows reconstruction and economic growth, and it permits government services and aid organizations to effectively operate. In some cases, the amount of manpower and equipment dedicated to providing security may actually be more than what was required to achieve the military defeat of the armed forces. The U.S. limits the assets dedicated to providing security during critical post conflict operations at the absolute peril of any attempt to impose democracy. It requires objective analysis of the post conflict situation along with the detailed planning and commitment of required assets.

Dr Bellin explains that the level of commitment by the U.S. to achieve success in imposing democracy is measured in the resources it is willing to devote.²⁸ This is the second element of the evaluation criteria, and the second most important factor after security. These resources include manpower, finance, diplomacy, industry, informational, and time. Such commitment must be realistic based on the objective and realistic analysis of what and how much is required for success, and not limited to a slim commitment based on domestic politics and rhetoric. Commitment is not limited to material items, but must include the moral aspect of the collective will of the American people.

²⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 11.

²⁸ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 602.

The third element of the evaluation criteria is governance and participation. Governance and participation, according to Bellin, “addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes.”²⁹ General Douglas MacArthur clearly understood this concept as he embarked on his mission to transform post war Japan in 1945: “I knew that the whole occupation would fail if we did not proceed from this one basic assumption – the reform had to come from the Japanese.”³⁰ Bellin points out effective state institutions are key factors influencing good governance and participation by the people. She describes effective state institutions as “meritocratically organized and rule-bound” organizations such as the police, the judicial system, and other bureaucratic institutions of state.³¹ These institutions must exist previously and success may depend on those institutions remaining relatively intact following military defeat. Another enabling factor discussed by Bellin relative to good governance and participation concerns the matter of degree of a nation’s prior experience with meaningful democracy and the desire of the people to have democracy. Bellin points out that the record of democratic transition around the world indicates that those with the most success at transitioning to democracy had some degree of experience with democracy from which to draw when building a new democratic state.³² Not only does it help for a country to have some experience with democracy for it to work and endure, but the people themselves must actually want it. During a meeting of the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005, Francis Fukuyama echoed this concept: “democracy cannot come about in any society unless there is a strong domestic demand by local actors – elites, the masses, or civil society – that want it. You cannot impose democracy on a country that does not want to be democratic.”³³ A final element of governance and

²⁹ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 602.

³⁰ General Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, (New York: Crest Books, 1964), 337.

³¹ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 599

³² *Ibid*, 599.

³³ Francis Fukuyama, *Do We Really Know How To Promote Democracy?* Address to the meeting of the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005. Transcript of remarks is available on line from the Foreign Policy Association at www.fpa.org.

participation derived from Bellin states that a country attempting to transition to democracy must also have “leaders of national stature capable of sponsoring the democratic process.”³⁴ Such leaders are critical in their endorsement of and leadership toward a democratic state in order for the people to embrace the concept and allow democracy to endure.

The fourth element of the evaluation criteria is social and economic well-being. According to Orr, social and economic well-being “addresses fundamental and economic needs of the population, in particular the provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive sustainable development program. As the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development.”³⁵ The average person must experience a dramatic improvement in their socio-economic status as a result of imposed democracy and liberation (occupation?).³⁶ In the absence of the psychological and emotional impact of defeat caused by total war, the people of countries we target for forced democratization will have certain unrealistic expectations of the U.S. to deliver social and economic improvement, and their patience to wait for such delivery will not be tempered by the privations of defeat through total war. The result could be catastrophic in the negative impact on maintaining a secure environment as the people start or support an existing armed resistance. Lieutenant General Petraeus understood this concept from his experience as a division commander in Iraq from 2003 to 2004:

“The liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation. The length of this half-life is tied to the perceptions of that populace about the impact of the

³⁴Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 600.

³⁵Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 11.

³⁶ The placement of the word occupation in parenthesis following the word liberation in this sentence is only slightly cynical based on the author’s experience as an infantry battalion commander in Iraq, 2003-2004. The U.S. military – particularly its leaders- were forbidden to use the word “occupation” as well as “insurgency” or “resistance”. The non-cynical point here being that it is not so important what we think or say here at home in the U.S. on the news for political and popular consumption. If the people of a given country see or feel themselves as occupied, then we are in fact an occupation force and must do what we can to change that perception or suffer the consequences that are sure to follow if no corrective action is taken.

liberating force's activities. From the moment a force enters a country; its leaders must keep this in mind, striving to meet the expectations of the liberated in what becomes a race against the clock."³⁷

Two contributing elements to social and economic well-being come from Bellin. Those elements are the level of economic development of the country in question, and its degree of ethnic homogeneity. Economic development refers to the level of development in terms of advanced industrialization, Gross National Product (GNP), education and skill level of the work force, and the organizational capabilities of businesses and corporations. Bellin points out that economic development is not necessarily critical to initiate a transition to democracy, but that "for democracy to endure, historical experience suggests that the chances for democratic survival are directly linked to GNP."³⁸ Relative to the concept of ethnic homogeneity, Bellin states that "democratic theory suggests that ethnic homogeneity is an important factor in shaping democratic outcomes."³⁹ A nation is less likely to fracture along ethnic lines with defeat in war as a catalyst when there is a great degree of ethnic homogeneity. Bellin's concept of ethnic homogeneity and the lack of pre-existing fissures along ethnic lines also factors into the fifth element of the evaluation criteria, which is justice and reconciliation.

Justice and reconciliation, according to Orr, "addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system, and for ways to deal with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict."⁴⁰ The rule of law, transparency of the law, and confidence in the legal and justice apparatus of a nation is

³⁷ LTG David H. Petraeus., Observations From Soldiering in Iraq, (*Military Review*, January-February 2006), 3. The use of words can have roots in political rhetoric. If we insist we are liberators but the people of a given country see us as occupiers, no amount of Orwellian insistence by political masters that we are "liberators" will change the reality that the people view us otherwise. From the author's experience, the U.S. Army clearly reached the zenith of its liberator half-life in late 2003, and slowly began its decent into the role of despised occupier.

³⁸ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 597.

³⁹ Ibid, 598.

critical for democracy to not only succeed, but to endure. The same caveat relative to cultural awareness mentioned reference governance above applies here as well. The people must view the legal and justice system as compatible with their cultural, ethnic, and historical traditions. We can not simply transplant the U.S. system and expect it to work or be acceptable. Bellin's concept of effective state institutions as discussed in the definition of governance and participation above also influences the effectiveness of the element of justice and reconciliation.

The sixth element of the evaluation criteria, the psychology of defeat, is a key element Bellin discusses when comparing the state of mind of the peoples of Germany and Japan with those of Iraq following military defeat. Germany and Japan were utterly defeated as a result of total war, whereas Iraq was not. She points out that the level of defeat experienced by a population can be a significant catalyst for making an undemocratic society more receptive to accepting democracy.⁴¹ At the very least, a nation brought to its knees in utter defeat will exhibit a considerable amount of patience in waiting for the benefits of democracy to take root. Gordon Wright, in *The Ordeal of Total War*, discusses the "revolutionary impact" of total war on a society due to the dramatic changes forced on a given society through the massive destruction and privation suffered as a result of the nature of total war.⁴² A people have a difficult time organizing for resistance of occupation and are more receptive to change when they are simply thankful the killing has stopped and they are reduced to searching for food and shelter to survive.

Multilateralism, the final element of the evaluation criteria, is relatively self-explanatory. It is important to have as many allies and supporters from around the region and the world when attempting any military venture. "Going it alone" means exactly that. The more partners, friends and allies we incorporate in a given venture reduces the burden on the U.S., shows strategic

⁴⁰Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 11.

⁴¹ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 601- 602

⁴² Gordon Wright, *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945*, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), 234-236.

support for our position and cause, and can positively influence world opinion to mute condemnation at the very least, and illicit supportive UN resolutions at best.

As defined above, the evaluation criteria for this monograph are security, level of U.S. commitment, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, psychology of defeat, and multilateralism. By applying all of the above criteria to various degrees, this monograph hypothesizes that the U.S. can successfully force democracy on an undemocratic state without resorting to total war but it can only do so through a comprehensive plan that includes the coordinated and integrated application of all instruments of national power and influence. So far, we have identified key definitions as well as what criteria the monograph will use to evaluate past, present, and future attempts by the U.S. to force democratization of an undemocratic nation without resorting to total war. Chapter I outlines the Germany and Japan success stories as the model for successful forced democratization, and evaluates the model against the evaluation criteria in order to validate the model and the criteria for the remaining case studies. Chapter two reviews case studies of U.S. attempts to impose democracy by force since the Second World War by evaluating operations in Grenada and Panama. The third chapter evaluates the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq against the research evaluation criteria for successful forced democratization in the absence of total war, and assesses the U.S. competence in planning and executing these two operations by applying the evaluation criteria. The final chapter will suggest what future U.S. attempts to force democratization in the absence of total war should look like based on the synthesis of the assessments of all the case studies from World War II to the present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Can the United States successfully impose democracy by force without resorting to the same level of total warfare it waged on Germany and Japan in the Second World War? The analysis of the case studies that follow will show that the U.S. can impose democracy in the absence of total war, but it can only do so by committing the resources necessary to establish the foundation of a secure post-conflict environment that enables reconstruction and transformation.

CHAPTER I: The Gold Standard

The defeat, occupation and transformation of Germany and Japan into strong democracies and responsible productive members of the world community following the Second World War seem to be often referenced by military planners and politicians when discussing the forced democratization of other nations. Accurately or not, this comparison or reference is seen routinely in political messages, debates in Congress and in the media, and in conversations and lectures at military schools and planning cells. We will now evaluate the U.S. experience with post-war Germany and Japan through the lens of the evaluation criteria in order to establish a better understanding of how and why the U.S. was so successful in imposing democracy in Germany and Japan following total war. Total war was certainly an undeniable factor, but how much of a factor? How well did the U.S. ensure strategic victory was gained from battlefield successes against those countries through planning and preparation that included all the elements of our evaluation criteria? The insights gained from this analysis will help to evaluate other past endeavors, and serve as a basis for determining if and how the U.S. can successfully impose democracy by force without waging total war.⁴³

The U.S. began planning and preparing for the occupation of Germany and Japan as early as 1942 with two embryonic events. The Secretary of War established “The School of Military Government” at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia on 2 April 1942.⁴⁴ The purpose of the school was to train a cadre of officers who would be able to move in behind victorious U.S. forces to establish and maintain governance in liberated areas and conquered areas of the enemy homeland. The school incorporated lessons learned from the U.S. experience during the occupation of Germany’s Rhineland following the First World War. The instructors

⁴³ Although Italy began the Second World War as an enemy of the U.S., it made a separate peace with the Allies before the end of the war and actively participated with elements of its military in the fight against the Germans in Italy. Italy’s occupation by the U.S. was a much different scenario than the defeated nations of Germany and Japan. The comparison of how Italy was treated after the war with the fate of Germany and Japan could constitute another study unto itself. As a result, this study will not use the example of post-World War II Italy as a reference or model.

included not only civilian experts on the various aspects of governance, but experts on Germany, Japan, and Italy as well. By 14 August 1942, the War Department directed the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major General Allen W. Gullion, to “engage in broad planning” for occupation and governance of areas liberated from German and Japanese occupation and areas of Germany and Japan conquered by the U.S..⁴⁵ The War Department established the Civil Affairs Division on 1 March 1943 as a separate entity responsible for governance that reported directly to the Secretary of War.⁴⁶ As early as three years before the capitulation of Germany and Japan, the U.S. military understood that it would have a role in governance of the liberated countries and territories as well as in the occupied countries of the defeated Axis.

The concept of military governance and the planning for it continued to evolve throughout the military campaigns from 1942 through 1945. Civil Affairs officers began arriving in the European Theater of Operations by January of 1943, and governance planning with Eisenhower’s staff began in July of 1943.⁴⁷ The forward-thinking staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) developed a plan for the occupation and governance of Germany as early as January of 1944. Dubbed the “Troubridge Plan” after its British staff officer author, the plan formed the embryo of occupation thinking for SHAEF in that it envisioned an evolution of total occupation and governance as the Allies seized parts of Germany prior to

⁴⁴ Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), 7.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 10. The military and the U.S. government planners foresaw situations where U.S. forces would possibly liberate an Axis-occupied part of a country (such as France) but would have to establish some sort of governance in that area until the central government could reestablish control and governance. They also saw this same dilemma potentially occurring in a former colony of an ally liberated from Axis occupation (Algeria or Malaysia, for example). The types of governance implemented in “liberated” areas would naturally differ from the type imposed on “conquered” and subsequently occupied areas belonging to the Axis.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 17. Throughout 1942, there were a series of “turf battles” between the War Department and members of Congress over military or civilian primacy in occupation and governance. This squabble ended in favor of the military when, during the North Africa campaign, it became clear that the security situation in the liberated and conquered areas was not conducive to pure civilian control. The military would have to have control of governance throughout the occupation phase, and then transition the areas to civilian control.

capitulation.⁴⁸ The SHAEF staff understood that phase IV operations would begin before phase III operations ended with the formal capitulation of Germany.⁴⁹ By 24 September 1944, the Joint Chiefs issued *JCS 1067* to Eisenhower, which detailed the strategic guidance and U.S. national policy for the occupation of Germany.⁵⁰ All of the analysis and planning at the strategic and operational levels culminated in the first draft of the final SHAEF plan, ECLIPSE, in November 1944.⁵¹ The ECLIPSE plan, expanding on the embryonic Troubridge plan, envisioned a “carpet” phase during which civil affairs units would move in behind combat units as they advanced into Germany in order to impose U.S. will and govern the conquered areas. The ECLIPSE plan then envisioned a transition to a “static” plan following German capitulation and cessation of hostilities during which the Army headquarters became district headquarters or governing bodies under General Eisenhower as the military governor of the U.S. zone. Almost a year before the end of the war in Europe, the U.S. had a detailed strategic plan supported with all necessary military and considerable civilian assets to ensure success.⁵²

Further evidence of the level of post conflict preparation by the U.S. can be found in the series of military handbooks for commanders from multi-star flag officer level down through captain level commands. These handbooks all began appearing at various times in 1944 and provided U.S. commanders with a variety of useful information ranging from history, ethnicity, culture, language, religion, social classes, pre-war government, Nazi Party organization, banks and money, courts and law, the police and security system, and the existing war-time government.

⁴⁷ Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), 24-27.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 7.

⁴⁹ A concept apparently overlooked by the operational and strategic leadership of the U.S. when planning for Afghanistan and Iraq almost 60 years later.

⁵⁰ Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), 104-105.

⁵¹ Ibid, 163.

⁵² Most of the civilian assets involved the high level expertise civilians would provide to Eisenhower in the realm of economics, industry, education and the like. The plan also expanded the role of civilians by bringing experienced (sometimes much older than the average officers serving) and specialized civilians into the civil affairs branch of the military as direct commissionees for the specific purpose of occupation and governance.

The handbooks also provided detailed information on U.S. policy for occupation, along with the duties, responsibilities, and authority of commanders in occupied Germany. The handbooks also included maps depicting such items as German's pre-war boundaries, locations of German states and "counties," and the boundaries of the various Allied zones of responsibility.⁵³

Analysis of the research shows the U.S. had a well developed and resourced plan for occupation and governance of Germany and Japan both prior to and following official capitulation that invested all the resources of the nation, and incorporated all the elements of national power and influence. The level of U.S. commitment in resources, to include time, ensured that battlefield successes that defeated both foes in war could be forged into strategic victory through successful democratization by force of Germany and Japan.

Security in occupied Germany and Japan was arguably adequate given that no insurgencies or armed civil unrest developed that was directed at the occupation.⁵⁴ This was due to several factors. The United States had approximately 1.7 million troops in Germany from May to August of 1945.⁵⁵ The population of the U.S. zone at that time was estimated at between eighteen and nineteen million, resulting in a troop-to-civilian ratio during those critical early months of occupation of roughly eleven-to-one.⁵⁶ The Allies initially occupied Japan, with its population of seventy-two million, with a force of some 354,675 troops from September through

⁵³ Actual copies of these hand-books can be found at the Eisenhower and Truman presidential libraries. The author was astounded by the level of detail and information provided in these handbooks – particularly the pocket-sized captain level commander version (which was apparently written by a team of British SHAEF staff officers based on the UK spelling contained within – a clear indicator of the level of Allied integration at SHAEF, incidentally). The author never saw a similar product produced by CENTCOM, the Army, or DoD during the 2003-2004 period as a battalion commander, and subsequent interviews with tactical level commanders with recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan confirms that a similar handbook still does not exist at the tactical level. Any such handbooks are being produced by individual battalions, brigades, and some divisions. Nothing close to the level of preparation provided by SHAEF in 1944!

⁵⁴ Both countries experienced a degree of healthy civil criticism that one finds in democracies through the media and other outlets such as peaceful demonstrations. The new Japanese government experienced a significant degree of sharp criticism in the papers and radio due to corruption, inequity, and incompetence. Germany experienced a lesser amount than Japan. In both cases, the criticism was directed against the government and not the occupying Allies. In either case, no insurgencies or armed civil unrest developed in either country as a result.

⁵⁵ John McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 14.

December, 1945.⁵⁷ This resulted in a troop-to-civilian ratio of approximately one for every two hundred. In both countries, the police forces remained operational, albeit depleted.⁵⁸ Although the secret security police forces had to be eliminated, and undesirable members of the civil police forces had to be screened and removed, the Allies were able to rely on them to assist in enforcing law and order and securing the population. The final factor that contributed to the security of post-war Germany and Japan was the psychology of defeat, and it is discussed below. It is also one of the evaluation criteria, and the research shows that it is inexorably linked to successfully providing a secure environment in post-war Germany and Japan.

Analysis of the research shows that the U.S. was able to establish effective security in the occupied countries through adequate numbers of “boots of the ground.” It was clearly aided in this critical task by the pre-existence of the effective state institution of law enforcement and effective court systems in both countries. The U.S. also provided effective governance through its military commanders and trained civil affairs personnel, to provide the foundation for local and national governance by the occupied people themselves. The governance piece was aided by effective state institutions, historical experience with democratic aspects of government prior to the war, and leaders of national stature who embraced the democratic project within their countries and held the trust and respect of their fellow countrymen.

The *Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone* dated 20 August 1945, paints a very good picture of the level of devastation in occupied Germany. The document reported that forty percent of the German population was homeless, that only ten armored vehicles from the former Wehrmacht were captured in operational condition, and that food consumption by more

⁵⁶ Ibid, 14-16.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 27-32. The Original occupation plans by SCAP called for a force of 600,000. MacArthur changed the plan once occupation began and he saw that the Allies could control the devastated Japanese with fewer troops on the ground. He also learned from the ETO experience that less troops were apparently required to control the devastated and exhausted country.

⁵⁸ According to McGrath’s research, the German police force in the U.S. zone by the end of the first year of occupation was some 299,264. This number shrank to 117,224 by the end of the second year (pg 25). The Japanese civil police from 1945 through 1946 remained steady at some 94,000 (pg 32).

than eighty percent of the population was below the subsistence level of two thousand calories daily.⁵⁹ The report also discusses the status of German prisoners of war. Approximately two million German prisoners of war were retained until 1947 as laborers to assist in reconstruction of the countries Germany had occupied such as France, Belgium, and Holland. France received the largest amount of German prisoners to serve as laborers until 1947 with 1.3 million.⁶⁰

Japan's story is similar. Thirty percent of Japanese were reported as homeless, and sixty-five percent of the residences in Tokyo were reported as destroyed, while the majority of the population received an average of only 1,375 calories daily out of 2,000 required for minimal sustenance.⁶¹ Hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers were kept as prisoners by the U.S., UK and France for use as laborers until 1947, while the Soviet Union retained between 1.6 and 1.7 million until 1949.⁶² 6.5 million Japanese (3.5 million military) were stranded outside the Japanese islands the day Japan capitulated, and by one year later two million had still not been repatriated, with the Japanese government unable to determine the whereabouts of over 540,000 missing others.⁶³ The defeat of the Japanese was so complete that the majority of the Japanese population rejected the military and actually viewed the Allies as liberators from a death sentence.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ *Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone: 20 August 1945*. This report was submitted monthly and ultimately reached the President of the United States' desk. The last report was submitted 20 September, 1949. The Truman Presidential Library contains every one of these reports from Germany and Japan (SCAP). Both reports are virtually identical in format, and cover every aspect imaginable that would be relative to governing a large industrial country. Oddly enough, the reports do not contain page numbers.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York, Norton and Company, 1999), 45. The Japanese homeless rate was less than that of Germany due to two primary factors. The first being the rural nature of the majority of the Japanese islands, and the second that saturation bombing against Japan – although devastating – was not able to reach its peak until late in the war as compared to Germany.

⁶² John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York, Norton and Company, 1999), 51-52. Only about 95,000 of the almost 2 million Japanese prisoners held by the U.S.S.R actually made it back to Japan.

⁶³ Ibid, 48-50. 500,000 Japanese soldiers were stranded on Formosa in 1945, along with some 400,000 in Korea.

⁶⁴ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York, Norton and Company, 1999), 58-63. Dower discusses a phenomenon known as "Kyodatsu." Japanese psychologists referred to the condition as a state of overwhelming exhaustion and despair that was the result of continuous war since 1931. Life under an oppressive government that had indoctrinated all of its citizens to

All these figures portray nations in utter defeat. It is very difficult to plan and organize for insurrection or to resist occupation when the majority of the population is reduced to searching for food and shelter for survival. The utter devastation inflicted on Germany and Japan enabled the Allies to dictate, with little or no opposition or complaint from the occupied countries, fundamental changes in government, economy, and even the cultures of both nations. The U.S. State Department issued this statement on 30 June 1945 prior to the Berlin Conference reference the U.S. policy on what message the German people were to receive and understand: “(We must) convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and they cannot escape responsibility.”⁶⁵ General MacArthur best described the psychology of defeat in Japan through total war: “Never in history had a nation and its people been more completely crushed than were the Japanese at the end of the war. Their entire faith in the Japanese way of life, cherished as invincible for many centuries, perished in the agony of their total defeat.”⁶⁶

Analysis of the research shows that the shock of utter defeat cannot be underestimated as a key contributing factor to the successful occupation and transformation of Germany and Japan following World War II. The level of defeat inflicted upon the Germans and Japanese was due in large part to the level of commitment to win the war by the U.S. The psychology of defeat experienced by the Germans and the Japanese at the end of the war can not be underestimated or dismissed. Eva Bellin’s comment on the psychology of defeat states it very effectively:

“What is most striking in the historical accounts of Japan and Germany in the immediate postwar period was the sense of utter defeat and desperation that

believe that they were already dead in their service to the country and the Emperor, and that their death was not a matter of “if” but “when.” This concept was called “Yamato Damashii” or “Japanese Spirit. Hence, all Japanese were considered “Spirit Warriors” in their endeavor to die for the glory of Japan and the Emperor as condemned men. This “Kyodatsu” condition contributed to the sense of immediate relief many Japanese felt when the Emperor told them they were defeated and the war was over, but it conflicted with the ingrained belief that they had somehow failed the Emperor by failing to die for him. The Kyodatsu condition was a significant factor influencing the Japanese to reject the military and its government and embrace the Allies as liberators who literally rescued them from a death sentence.

⁶⁵ Papers of President Harry S. Truman, Naval Aide Files, Policy Towards Germany Volume I

⁶⁶ General Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, (New York: Crest Books, 1964), 321

pervaded their societies. The Japanese and Germans were eager to break with the past and embrace something new.”⁶⁷

The shock of utter defeat as a result of total war, served as an enabler for the U.S. in its efforts to occupy, secure, govern, rebuild, and transform the societies of postwar Germany and Japan. It directly affected the security status in both countries, the immediate elimination of militaristic dictatorships along with all of their trappings, the willingness of both populations to accept sweeping changes in government and the social fabric, and the willingness to accept international justice and reconciliation for waging war against their neighbors and oppression of their internal dissidents.

The U.S. was clearly and substantially committed to winning the Second World War far above political rhetoric and posturing for the media and voters. Every aspect of the U.S. economy, industry, diplomacy, information, finance, manpower, society and national patience were fully engaged and leveraged to wage total war and ensure lasting strategic victory. More important than the commitment to winning battles across the globe was the U.S. commitment to occupy, govern, and transform Germany and Japan to responsible democracies committed to peaceful co-existence with their neighbors. This is evidenced by the example in Germany that saw U.S. (and Allied) occupation and governance until August of 1949 when the Germans were finally permitted to elect and organize a Parliament with subsequent election of its first post-war Chancellor in September of the same year.⁶⁸ Even at that point, President Truman understood that his nation’s commitment was not complete when he made this comment on 9 July 1951:

“The progress which has been made in the recovery of Europe and in the strengthening of democratic institutions there makes it appropriate at this time to end the status of Germany as an enemy country. The termination of the state of war with Germany will not affect the status of occupation.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 601

⁶⁸ Konrad Adenauer

⁶⁹ Papers of President Harry S. Truman. George M. Elsey collection, letter from Truman to Alben Barkley dated July 9, 1951. Presidential Library of Harry S. Truman, Independence, Missouri.

Japan's treatment was similar in that its civilian government and the Emperor were allowed to govern but were subordinated to SCAP (General MacArthur specifically).⁷⁰ Research for this study shows the author that the level of commitment by the U.S. of all its resources to win victory is the standard by which U.S. commitment to war must be measured when it has determined that a threat exists to its national security.

Further evidence of the level of commitment by the U.S. during the Second World War is the level of multilateralism it was willing to seek (endure?) in order to prosecute the war. The U.S. chose not to "go it alone," but rather sought the assistance and cooperation of other nations to achieve a degree of unity of effort and unity of purpose. The multitude of conferences held to achieve such cooperation throughout the war between the U.S., UK, the USSR and France required commitment by all involved to achieve the unity of effort and purpose required to achieve victory over the Axis.⁷¹

Germany and Japan possessed prior experience with democratic institutions before military dictators hijacked the two countries. The Post World War I Weimar Republic was a representative democratic government in Germany. Although Japan was more feudal, it did have the Taisho democracy. Both forms of democracy were arguably flawed, but they did provide both countries with "crucial political institutions, practices, and habits of mind to call upon when building their new democracies in the postwar period."⁷² The democratic transition was assisted

⁷⁰ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York, Norton and Company, 1999), 34-39. See also General Douglas MacArthur's *Reminiscences*. It is an interesting memoir by the SCAP commander with his insights on what his specified, implied and assumed authority and responsibilities were while serving as Japan's governor-general after the war.

⁷¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), Volumes 1 – 6. The memoirs of Winston Churchill provide great insight into the creation and maintenance of the alliance. His accounts of the discussions, arguments and compromises at the various conferences are very illuminating and reflect the level of political and diplomatic commitment the Allies had to achieving victory. The papers of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower also provide fantastic insight to the U.S. perspective of maintaining an alliance while prosecuting a global war.

⁷² Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 600

by what Eva Bellin refers to as “leaders of national stature” who were capable of “sponsoring the democratic process.”⁷³

Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher were two influential Germans who enjoyed significant legitimacy with both the Allies and the German people because they chose not to leave Germany in exile, and suffered at the hands of the Nazis as a result. Their example and their “embrace of the democratic project after the war helped anchor it at home.”⁷⁴ Japan’s greatest leader of national stature to embrace the idea of a new Japan in which the people were citizens rather than subjects was Emperor Hirohito himself. The Emperor endorsed the democratic project in his country and played a central role in helping it work. He even transformed his image to the Japanese people. Before the war, his public image was of a uniformed imperial ruler on a magnificent white stallion reviewing military parades and maneuvers. After the war, he was seen on foot in a western style business suit and made a signature habit of doffing his hat to his fellow Japanese citizens whenever he passed them by.⁷⁵

Both nations possessed strong traditions of effective institutions of governance as well. These systems did not require creation from scratch, but only required a degree of redesign and adaptation in order to eliminate the vestiges of militarism and dictatorship. The pre-existence of effective state institutions for governance significantly aided in the democratization of Germany and Japan as both nations were rebuilding after the war. A significant subset of good governance and effective state institutions is the rule of law and the level of justice and reconciliation the people can expect from their government. Both Germany and Japan had pre-existing effective justice systems that, once expunged of their militarist and fascist trappings, were able to revert back to their traditional and trusted roles. The confidence in the system was bolstered by the support the Allied occupation forces provided that allowed for grievances against the militarist

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York, Norton and Company, 1999), 302-318, also 332-333.

dictatorships to be equitably resolved. More importantly, the people of Germany and Japan had faith in their justice systems and that their occupiers were committed to the rule of law, effective law enforcement, and an impartial justice system.⁷⁶

The relative ethnic homogeneity of the occupied populations of Germany and Japan also contributed to the lack of violence and the adherence to the rule of law following the war. Neither Germany nor Japan had pre-existing ethnic or religious fault lines that could be exploited or would serve as a cause to fracture the societies of either nation with defeat in war as a catalyst. Other than the traditional class divides found in almost all countries, Germany and Japan lacked large enclaves of ethnic minorities who might seize the opportunity created by national defeat to gain autonomy or at least a greater share of power in the post war society and government.⁷⁷

Although the industrial and economic capacity of Germany and Japan were utterly destroyed during the war, both nations had been economically and industrially strong before the war. They had, in fact, waged global war against the most economically and industrially advanced nations in the world. They possessed the expertise, and the technical and conceptual capacity and traditions to compete with any of the most industrialized nations. This history of industrial and economic might provided the basis for both nations to look back on as they looked forward to rebuild themselves. Although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to illustrate the level of destruction and poverty in both nations following the war, the people of both nations also knew that their nations could eventually rise economically above their utter destruction and defeat to achieve economic well-being to at least pre-war levels. They knew it was possible, and were willing to have the patience to allow it to eventually occur.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 598-599.

⁷⁷ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 598.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 596-598.

Analysis of the research shows that the social and economic well being was aided by the economic and industrial capacities of both nations based on their pre-war status, the sweeping changes made by the occupation government, and the relative ethnic homogeneity of both countries. Justice and reconciliation was aided by the effective governance of the occupation forces through training, planning, and preparation. The effective legal traditions of both countries were also a contributing factor once expunged of the war time militarist influences.

In the final analysis of the U.S. success in post-war Germany and Japan, the U.S. waged total war against Germany and Japan during the Second World War and inflicted utter defeat on both nations. The subsequent occupation and transformation of both nations into democracies and productive, peaceful members of the world community took many years and was ultimately highly successful. All of the elements of the evaluation criteria were achieved by the U.S. in Germany and Japan. Thus Germany and Japan serve as our models for successfully imposing democracy on undemocratic nations.

The analysis further shows that although all elements of the evaluation criteria were fully achieved in the Germany and Japan models, security was the pre-eminent factor in providing success. All the remaining elements of the evaluation criteria served as enablers that contributed to establishing an environment sufficiently secure enough to enable successful forced democratization. In addition to a plan that provided sufficient forces to ensure security in both countries following the war, the psychology of defeat experienced by the Germans and Japanese provided the most significant enhancement to the U.S. security effort in both countries. The sufficient “boots on the ground” and psychology of defeat factors resulted from the willingness of the U.S. to commit the necessary resources to defeat, occupy, and transform post-war Germany and Japan into working democracies.

The next chapter evaluates U.S. attempts to impose democracy by force in the absence of total war since the Second World War and prior to the present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It examines efforts made by the U.S. in Grenada and Panama, by evaluating the operations in each of the countries against the evaluation criteria.

CHAPTER II: Two Success Stories

This chapter evaluates the intervention and imposed democracy in two countries, Grenada and Panama, since the Second World War and before the present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁷⁹ Each of the cases appears to be successful examples of forced democracy in the absence of the total war waged against Germany and Japan by the U.S. from 1941 to 1945. Why were these two recent operations by the U.S. apparently successful?

Starting with security as the most important factor in imposing democracy, we see that the scale of providing security in both countries was much smaller in comparison to World War II. This significantly reduced scale of the security problem was due to the relatively small populations of Grenada and Panama. Grenada's population of approximately 110,000, coupled with its meager defense force of 1,500 and 600 additional Cuban soldiers was easy to manage by the combined U.S. and Caribbean forces of more than 7,000.⁸⁰ The recently published Insurgency and Counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24) uses a ratio of one peacekeeper per every fifty civilians as a guideline for determining the size force required for establishing a secure environment. Based on that guideline, the U.S. required about 2,200 troops to effectively establish security in the post-conflict environment of Grenada.⁸¹ The relatively small U.S. and

⁷⁹ Although Haiti is an example of another U.S. attempt to impose democracy on a nation, it is still not at a point where the U.S. can claim it has been a successful operation. Although the U.S. learned some operational lessons from its involvement in Haiti, the purpose of this chapter is to assess why the U.S. enjoyed success in imposing democracy in the absence of total war in operations leading up to the present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarly, the U.S. learned many lessons relative to peacekeeping and multilateral operations in an ethnically and racially divided region in the Balkans. However, the U.S. involvement in the Balkans has been as a peacekeeper rather than an attempt to impose democracy. For that reason, the study does not include the Balkans as a case study for successful forced democracy in the absence of total war.

⁸⁰ Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*, (Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1989), 133-139.

⁸¹ United States Army, FM 3-24 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (Washington: Government printing Office, 15 December 2006) 1-13. This new Army publication draws from several sources to recommend the amount of security forces needed in a counterinsurgency campaign to successfully provide security

coalition force of 7,000 in Grenada was more than three times the requirement suggested by FM 3-24.

The 26,000- strong U.S. force for the invasion of Panama in 1989 faced an enemy regular army of about 4,000 and a population of a little over two million.⁸² Using the same guideline outlined in FM 3-24, the U.S. would have required a force of 40,000 troops. Although the numbers were about 10,000 short of the ideal ratio outlined in our new doctrine per FM 3-24, the U.S. was able to effectively maintain security in Panama. The popular support for the U.S. invasion of Panama was an enabler that possibly mitigated the apparent lack of forces necessary to establish security, and rendered the 26,000 man force sufficient for establishing a secure post-conflict environment. Popular support of the U.S. actions by Grenadines and Panamanians is discussed below.

A critical enabler for both cases was the overwhelming indigenous popular support for U.S. operations. A poll taken immediately following the U.S. invasion of Grenada revealed that 85% of the population of Grenada welcomed the U.S. military intervention as a rescue mission rather than as an invasion.⁸³ A similar survey conducted in the aftermath of the conflict in Panama showed that 92% of the Panamanian population viewed the U.S. action as a liberation rather than an invasion.⁸⁴

Analysis of the research shows that the popular support of the U.S. actions by the Grenadine and Panamanian people was a contributing factor in the ability of the U.S. to establish security in both operations. Their popular support for the U.S. military actions created an environment that was politically permissive in the post conflict stages of both operations and one

while combating the insurgent. The manual establishes the historical precedent for a requirement of a ratio of one counterinsurgent for every fifty residents for a successful counterinsurgent campaign.

⁸² Thomas Donnelley, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, (Lexington Books, New York, 1991), 71-87.

⁸³ Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*, (Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1989), 104. In fact, many Grenadines wanted the U.S. forces to remain indefinitely to keep the peace and assist in governance – they had had enough of their own politics and politicians!

⁸⁴ Peter Hutchthausen, *America's Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military Engagements, 1975-2000*, (Viking Books, New York, 2003), 126.

that was very forgiving of the mistakes and failures made by the U.S. in winning the peace after the conflict phases in both countries.

Both operations featured very short duration combat followed by relative calm. The only post conflict violence was lawlessness as a result of the lack of immediate police capability rather than any attempt to resist occupation or begin an insurgency.⁸⁵ The former police of both countries were allowed to quickly return to work with little or no screening out of undesirable elements in the short term interest of maintaining security.⁸⁶ In the case of Grenada, the UK assisted in weeding out the old undesirable elements and in rebuilding the Grenadine police force to resemble a more Western style civil police rather than their former paramilitary tradition.⁸⁷ In the case of Panama, the U.S. left the task of cleaning up the old Panamanian police force to the new Endara government.⁸⁸

Another element that influenced the security situation in Grenada and Panama was the relative homogenous nature of both countries. A review of the Central Intelligence Agency's on-line "World Fact Book" reveals that both nations lacked any significant ethnic or religious divides that could be exploited or aggravated by toppling the regimes that were in power. Grenada was predominately comprised of the descendants of African slaves at 82 percent, with white Europeans comprising the next largest minority at 13 percent. The majority of the inhabitants of

⁸⁵ Ibid, 382. The looting and lawlessness that resulted in the large cities of Panama (Panama City, Colon, and David) in the immediate security vacuum that occurred following the U.S. invasion was severe and was arguably not rivaled in scale resulting from U.S. action until the fall of Baghdad in 2003. The author's experience on the ground in Panama City in 1989 when this occurred was just as shocking, and frustrating then as in Iraq in 2003. We were not prepared for that level of lawlessness, and how does an army of "liberation" justify to its Soldiers, the liberated population, its own country, and the world the shooting of poor young men who are stealing food, clothes, and mattresses? Those committing acts of violence such as rape, murder and the like were obviously a different story and easy for U.S. Soldiers to handle with little or no moral conflict.

⁸⁶ From the author's perspective as a young participant in that operation, the U.S. lost much credibility with the local population because the U.S. placed the same people back in to authority who had only been abusing the people and their authority only a few days before. It was very hard for many of the less educated Panamanians to separate their former oppressors from the U.S. Soldiers patrolling the streets with them. We spent too much time explaining to the average Panamanian why this was allowed to happen.

⁸⁷ Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*, (Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1989), 323.

Grenada claimed some form of Christianity as their faith, with majority claiming Roman Catholicism. Panama's population consisted of 84 percent Amerindian-white European mix, with white Europeans comprising the next largest minority at ten percent. Nearly 100 percent of the people in Panama claimed Christianity as their faith, with some 85 percent following Catholicism.⁸⁹

Both countries arguably exhibited weak state institutions of government – including a reliable system for justice and reconciliation. Grenada received its independence and subsequent commonwealth status from the UK in 1974 after much civil unrest that had started in 1967.⁹⁰ The period following its independence was marked with civil unrest, coups, and the establishment of a Marxist dictatorship.⁹¹ Panama was not much better. The Panamanian people endured military dictatorships and rigged elections from 1969 to 1989 under Omar Torrijos and then Manuel Noriega.⁹² However, both nations did possess Bellin's "leaders of national stature" who were able to assist their nations in the transition to democracy after U.S. military action.

Grenada had Bellin's "leader of national stature" in the form of Sir Paul Scoon who, as the Governor General and representative of the Queen of England on the island, was able to serve effectively as the recognized and supported interim government of Grenada.⁹³ Panama's "leader of national stature" was Guillermo Endara, who had been popularly elected by the people in the democratic process. Manuel Noriega denied Endara his elected office when Noriega refused to

⁸⁸ Thomas Donnelley, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, (Lexington Books, New York, 1991), 353-354.

⁸⁹ United States Central Intelligence Agency, *The CIA World Fact Book*; Updated 15 December 2006 ; available from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> ; Internet ; accessed 9 January, 2007.

⁹⁰ Peter Hutchthausen, , *America's Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military Engagements 1975-2000*, (Viking Books, New York, 2003), 67.

⁹¹ Ibid, 68-72

⁹² Thomas Donnelley, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, (Lexington Books, New York, 1991), 6-46.

⁹³ Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*, (Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1989), 323. It must also be noted that the Grenadine people agreed with Scoon to not embark on a "witch hunt" to settle the score with former PRG and PRA members. This does count as some sort of "reconciliation" in that, in the best interest of the country's future, the people agreed to forgive and possibly forget any transgression committed by the former Marxist ruling organizations.

give up his status as a dictator and nullified the elections.⁹⁴ Following the U.S. invasion, the Panamanian government “self corrected” by simply swearing in the president the people had overwhelmingly democratically elected months before, and returning to work.⁹⁵

The psychology of defeat was not a factor on the people of Grenada and Panama, and nor was it necessary because they overwhelmingly supported and welcomed the U.S. actions in their countries. In Panama’s case, large portions of the armed forces surrendered or simply chose not to report for duty.⁹⁶ Many of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers and leaders were asked to avoid fighting the U.S. in return for being included in the new government and its military and, more importantly, it is a promise the U.S. kept once the shooting stopped.⁹⁷ The case was similar in Grenada, where much of the former security forces were given an opportunity to participate in the new government and brought back to duty.⁹⁸

The U.S. planning for and commitment to “Phase IV” actions after the conflict and the level of multilateralism differed sharply between the two operations. The U.S. and the UK provided massive monetary support to Grenada to assist in rebuilding the economy and infrastructure, and the UK assisted directly in the rebuilding of the Grenadine police force.⁹⁹ Additionally, the U.S. obtained the support of a coalition of Caribbean states to provide a multi-national Caribbean Peacekeeping Force from the countries of Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts, and St. Vincent.¹⁰⁰ This was contrasted sharply by the example in Panama where there was very little “Phase IV” planning other than to allow the

⁹⁴ Thomas Donnelley, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, (Lexington Books, New York, 1991), 44-46.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 353-354.

⁹⁶ Peter Hutchausen, *America’s Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military Engagements, 1975-2000*, (Viking Books, New York, 2003), 125

⁹⁷ Thomas Donnelley, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, (Lexington Books, New York, 1991), 353-354.

⁹⁸ Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*, (Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1989), 323.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 323-324.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 219-220.

Panamanian government under Endara to “self correct” and the U.S. obtained no coalition presence or support.¹⁰¹

Grenada and Panama were both countries where the U.S. imposed democracy by force by invading and removing the undemocratic government. Both Grenada and Panama can be counted as having successfully transformed from dictatorship to democracy, because they remain as democracies today and do not oppress their people or threaten their neighbors. Both are examples of successful forced democracy in the absence of total war. The U.S. did not mobilize its vast resources to wage war. It used a small fraction of its military capability and it did not destroy the militaries, population centers, industry, and other capabilities for the two countries. However, when applying the evaluation criteria against both operations and circumstances, it would seem that very few elements of the criteria were solidly met. So why did the U.S. have success in Grenada and Panama if it apparently failed to meet so much of the criteria for success?

Analysis of the research shows that forcing democracy in the absence of total war in Grenada and Panama was ultimately guaranteed by the ability of the U.S. to establish an acceptable level of post conflict security. The secure environment established during the post conflict phases in both countries was able to make up for the poor Phase IV planning along with the lack of committed resources and non-military elements of national power¹⁰² The next chapter studies the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Did we learn anything from the success we had in Grenada and Panama? More importantly, is it possible we learned the wrong lessons by not fully understanding why we did have success in imposing democracy in Grenada and Panama in the absence of total war?

¹⁰¹ Thomas Donnelley, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, (Lexington Books, New York, 1991), 375-382.

¹⁰² The majority of research material available points to a constant theme of poor or sloppy planning and execution of many of the key aspects relative to winning the peace in both countries following the kinetic conflict phases of URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE.

CHAPTER III: The Spectre of Failure: Afghanistan and Iraq

The chapter will evaluate two current operations in which the U.S. has invaded, removed the undemocratic government by force, and then attempted to impose democracy. The operations are Afghanistan (“Operation Enduring Freedom” or “OEF”) and Iraq (“Operation Iraqi Freedom” or “OIF”). The operation in Afghanistan began in the fall of 2001, and the operation in Iraq began in the spring of 2003. Both operations have continued to expend American blood and treasure, overextend its armed forces, and preoccupy domestic politics and foreign policies. Both Afghanistan and Iraq have degenerated into consuming counter-insurgency warfare, and the democratic future of both countries remains uncertain. The intensity of the insurgencies in both countries suggests a lack of success in forced democratization. In both cases, the U.S. chose not to resort to total war in order to achieve its aims- both in how the U.S. conducted the actual fight and the level of commitment of U.S. man power, industry, and economy. Why does it seem the U.S. has failed to achieve its aims in both countries after seemingly lightning-quick battlefield successes with minimal ground forces? The planning for post conflict operations in both countries lacked the level of detail, objective analysis, realistic goals and expectations, and energy required to promote success.¹⁰³

Comprehensive planning for Afghanistan was potentially hindered from the very top when President Bush repeatedly stated that U.S. troops would not be used for nation-building and that the U.S. was not in the business of doing so.¹⁰⁴ Although President Bush continuously opposed the idea of using the military for nation building, neither he nor any other member of the National Security Council or his other advisors and insiders could offer any other viable solution when Colin Powell– then the Secretary of State – repeatedly asked who was going to do it if the

¹⁰³ In the case with Afghanistan, it is arguable that the planning for the kinetic phase was poor and evolved while the military and CIA were actually in contact. See Bob Woodward’s *Bush at War*. If the planning for the kinetic phase of Afghanistan was haphazard and being “made up on the fly,” one can only imagine how slim the planning and energy was for post conflict operations.

¹⁰⁴ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002), 241.

military did not.¹⁰⁵ The lack of any comprehensive phase IV planning for Afghanistan created a significant gap between the time when the Taliban and al Qaeda were militarily defeated and when any effective delivery to the Afghani people of security, aid, and the supposed benefits of democracy could be made. Naturally, as the “honeymoon” wore off and the Afghani people began to realize that there was no plan or immediate delivery of what they expected from the fruits of democracy, the national tendency towards tribal, ethnic and war-lord control and rule began to fill the void. The statement by LTG Petraeus in the introduction chapter about the “half-life” of armies of liberation is applicable here too.¹⁰⁶ The lack of any real plan for the post conflict phase of Afghanistan caused the U.S. to miss a significant window of opportunity. The U.S. and its NATO coalition are still paying the price for missing that window of opportunity in Afghanistan in 2006.

The lack of post conflict planning for Iraq was similar to Afghanistan. All aspects of the planning for Afghanistan were limited due to the “no notice” reaction to September 11 and the absolute necessity to “do something” quickly. Iraq was the result of a deliberate planning process and the failure to develop a comprehensive post conflict plan for it was more deliberate and inexcusable. Colonel John Agoglia, one of the planners for General Franks in Central Command (CENTCOM), made this comment about the post conflict planning for OIF: “You had a lot of energy focused on the tactical piece, again Phase I through III. There wasn’t a whole lot of intellectual energy being focused on Phase IV.”¹⁰⁷ In the epilogue of *COBRA II*, the authors make the statement that the chaos that emerged in Iraq was not a matter of having no plan, but the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 237. The Bush administration continued to believe that the U.S. could get out of Afghanistan (and Iraq later) quickly because the grateful people would hail the U.S. as liberators, their government would spring to life and self-correct, and the UN and NATO would willingly show up to clean up the mess. This belief possibly stemmed from past experience with the successes in Grenada, Panama, and the Balkans.

¹⁰⁶ “The liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation. The length of this half-life is tied to the perceptions of that populace about the impact of the liberating force’s activities. From the moment a force enters a country; its leaders must keep this in mind, striving to meet the expectations of the liberated in what becomes a race against the clock.” See footnote number 32.

¹⁰⁷ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (Pantheon Books, New York, 2006), 140.

problem of adhering too much to the wrong plan.¹⁰⁸ Gordon and Trainor outline five “grievous errors” made by the Bush administration in preparing for and conducting the invasion and occupation of Iraq:

“They underestimated their opponent and failed to understand the welter of ethnic groups that is Iraq. They ...put too much confidence in technology. They remained wedded to their prewar analysis even after the Iraqis showed their penchant for guerilla tactics. They presided over a system in which differing military and political perspectives were discouraged. Finally, they turned their back on the nation-building lessons learned from the Balkans and other crisis zones and fashioned a plan that unrealistically sought to shift much of the burden onto a defeated and ethnically diverse population and allied nations that were enormously ambivalent about the invasion. There is a direct link between the way the Iraq War was planned and the bitter insurgency the American-led coalition subsequently confronted.”¹⁰⁹

The failure of the “wrong” plan was due mainly to the environment created by the Bush administration, mentioned above, that did not tolerate differing military and political perspectives. Plenty of military and civilian people were aware of the potential problems associated with regime change, occupation, and imposing democracy – particularly in a country like Iraq – and voiced their views. If they were outside the Bush Administration, they were ignored; if they were a part of the administration – particularly DoD – they were silenced. James Dobbins, an advisor to the Bush administration and its special envoy for Afghanistan, advised Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s man in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, to pay close attention to a RAND Corporation study on nation-building exercises from World War II to Afghanistan.¹¹⁰ The main theme of the study was that nation-building or peace-keeping operations required significantly more troops on the ground than traditional kinetic operations and that large peace-keeping forces were actually better than

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 497

¹⁰⁹ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (Pantheon Books, New York, 2006), 497-498

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 477 The authors of *Cobra II* do not list the RAND study in their notes or in the bibliography of the book. The RAND study to which they refer can be found on the RAND web site at www.rand.org. Its title is “America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq,” and it was published prior to March of 2003 (before the invasion of Iraq). The contributing authors for the study were James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathwell, Rachel Swanger, and Angela Timilsina. The information Gordon and Trainor refer to when citing James Dobbins comes from chapter nine of the study titled “Lessons Learned” (pp149-165).

smaller ones for keeping the peace.¹¹¹ The study pointed out that civilian and military casualty ratios increased in relation to the smaller size of a given peace keeping force. Adversaries were encouraged to challenge the peace keepers because of their small size and inability to be and see everywhere, so the amount of attacks and violence directed at the peace keepers actually increased. The smaller peace keeping forces traditionally had to rely on the use of increased fire power to make up for lack of forces on the ground. Both of these phenomena contributed to the statistical increase in civilian casualties when a smaller peace keeping force was employed.

The RAND study also cited NATO operational trends from the Balkans where the ratio of twenty peacekeepers to every one thousand civilians had been sufficient to preserve the peace and maintain a secure environment. Based on this ratio, the planning factor for the post conflict forces in Iraq should have been about 450,000!¹¹² This figure is very close to the figure of 470,000 suggested by some CENTCOM planners who were working on the post conflict occupation piece of OIF.¹¹³ The RAND study directly contradicted the Bush administration's concept of conducting military operations. Even General Abizaid suggested the possibility of needing an entire Army corps (III Corps in this case) to conduct the planning and execution of the occupation and post conflict phase of the operation.¹¹⁴ The Bush administration and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in particular, did not want to entertain any views that

¹¹¹ Ibid, 477.

¹¹² Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (Pantheon Books, New York, 2006), 477. The recent publication of the Army's Counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24) in December of 2006 uses the same formula of roughly one counterinsurgent for every fifty civilians as base line figure for planning force strength. The author's experience as a battalion commander in Iraq from 2003-2004 is interesting here. We had an area of operations (AO) that encompassed some 7,000 square kilometers in northwestern Iraq, and included 89 towns and villages and approximately 350,000 Iraqis. Our battalion task force consisted of 716 personnel, and we had a tough time attempting to establish a secure environment. According to the RAND study and the new COIN manual, the size force that should have been in our AO to guarantee security would be nearly ten times the size force we had.

¹¹³ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco, the American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin Press, New York, 2006), 79. Using a similar argument, former Defense Secretary William Perry had suggested a minimum force of 300,000 (See page 96).

¹¹⁴ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (Pantheon Books, New York, 2006), 141. He made this suggestion prior to becoming the CENTCOM commander.

contradicted their belief that a small footprint could be made more lethal and effective through the application of massive technology. Nor did they wish to entertain the notion that the Iraqis would do anything other than cheer the U.S. on as liberators. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz attacked the critics of the OSD's vision for Iraq during a briefing to the House Budget Committee:

“There has been a good deal of comment – some of it quite outlandish – about what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq. Some of the higher end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off mark.”¹¹⁵

Wolfowitz went on to echo the sentiment of the OSD and the Bush administration by stating that it was absurd to believe that it could possibly require more troops to secure Iraq than it took to defeat Saddam's army, especially if the Iraqi people would hale the Americans as liberators.¹¹⁶ Colin Powell attempted to influence the plan for the post conflict phase, by telling President Bush that Iraq was not going to be easy to transition to democracy, and that the U.S. – more likely the military – would have to run the government: “You will become the government until you get a new government. You will become the proud owner of 25 million people. It's going to suck the oxygen out of everything. You break it, you own it.”¹¹⁷

Other military and civilian experts offered sage advice for the planning for Iraq as well. Some seventy civilian and military experts on the Middle East and post conflict operations met at the National Defense University (NDU) in November of 2002 and concluded that the primary task of any post invasion force in Iraq would be to establish a secure environment.¹¹⁸ The group's recommendations further outlined the post conflict security mission as a daunting task and

¹¹⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco, the American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin Press, New York, 2006), 97.

¹¹⁶ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco, the American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin Press, New York, 2006), 98. Although this had been the case in Grenada and Panama, and may have influenced the thinking of the administration insiders, they failed to recognize that the dynamics in Iraq were not the same as those in Grenada and Panama.

¹¹⁷ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2004), 150.

¹¹⁸ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco, the American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin Press, New York, 2006), 71-72.

warned that it was far beyond the scale the Bush administration was envisioning. The report also warned against any rapid dissolution of the Iraqi military in order to avoid dumping some 1.4 million men on a shattered economy.¹¹⁹

Similar meetings occurred within the military circles in the latter part of 2002 to review shortfalls from Afghanistan and attempt to apply lessons learned from Afghanistan and the Balkans to the planning for Iraq. These meetings were held at the Army War College and in the Pentagon itself. The attendees at both meetings warned against the proclivity for a short term approach – more tactical than strategic – by the top defense officials that ignored long-term goals, and opined for a comprehensive post conflict plan that addressed the severe security and economic issues associated with a post war Iraq. The Pentagon meeting cautioned against a sweeping “de-Baathification” process that would alienate large portions of Iraqi society, and suggested a gradual bottom-up approach led by non-Baathist Iraqis, much like the model used for de-Nazification after World War II.¹²⁰ The attendees also reiterated the caution from the NDU meeting by strenuously advising against disbanding the Iraqi military:

“In a highly diverse and fragmented society like Iraq, the military...is one of the few national institutions that stresses national unity as an important principal. To tear apart the army in the war’s aftermath could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces for unity within the society.”¹²¹

Major General Odierno (at the time of writing, he is the commander of III Corps/ Multi-National Corps - Iraq as a Lieutenant General), the commander of the Army’s 4th Infantry Division in Iraq from 2003-2004 discussed the effect of the negative culture of the OSD on commanders on the battlefield relative to their ability to plan and have freedom of action:

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 72. What the report did not include in that warning was the danger of also alienating and disaffecting the 300,000 man regular army that had the training and could potentially obtain the equipment for mounting an effective insurgency or resistance.

¹²⁰ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco, the American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin Press, New York, 2006), 72-73.

¹²¹ Ibid.

“Decisions were taken out of our hands. We lost a window of opportunity when it would have done the most good.”¹²²

The debilitating effect of the environment created by the OSD’s unwillingness to entertain advice or opinions counter to their own – to the point of cowing military commanders on the battlefield – presented a significant obstacle to developing the right plan based on the right assumptions and analysis for achieving success in Iraq. Additionally, the research for this study shows that expertise, advice, knowledge, situational and environmental understanding were present outside the inner circle of a few men at OSD and the White House that could have provided the right plan had that advice been heeded. The advice of many military and civilian experts included a call for a significant deployment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure a secure environment after forces of the enemies in both countries were defeated.

The ability of the U.S. to provide secure environments in Afghanistan and Iraq has apparently failed to date as evidenced by the raging insurgencies in both countries. As stated in the introduction, security is the most important of all criteria for imposing democracy. Without a secure environment, the government cannot function, the economy cannot improve, and reconstruction grows nearly impossible. The U.S. failed to deploy enough forces to Afghanistan to ensure the destruction of the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The Rumsfeld demand for a light foot print in Afghanistan forced the U.S. to rely too heavily on the Northern Alliance and local war lords to provide combat forces for the major fighting and then to provide security after the major fighting was over. By not committing enough troops to ensure security and then relying too much on the war lords and their militias for that security, the U.S., only served to entrench the warlords and consolidate their power throughout Afghanistan and ultimately undercut the authority of the new central government.¹²³ As the U.S. realized its mistake and then sought to

¹²² Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (Pantheon Books, New York, 2006), 491.

¹²³ Milan Vaishnav, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 245.

disband the militias of the warlords before the Afghani National Army (ANA) was capable, and in the continuing absence of adequate numbers of U.S. or NATO troops on the ground, it exacerbated the security problem by making it worse.

Lieutenant General John R. Vines, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan had this to say about the militias: “Militias are part of the existing reality. Some are legitimate, and some are predators...but the challenge is, if you disestablish a militia, who provides security? The vacuum can be filled by anarchy.”¹²⁴ The attempt to skimp on the amount of forces needed to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda (AQ) and then provide security for reconstruction afterwards resulted in failure to destroy the Taliban and AQ forces and failure to provide security necessary for successful reconstruction and a functioning government. The stop-gap measure of using warlord militias to make up for the lack of sufficient U.S. forces did not establish effective security, and only served to diminish the credibility and power of the new central government. Afghanistan is still not secure, and the continually deteriorating security situation throughout the country has preoccupied the U.S. (and now NATO) to the detriment of the reconstruction effort.¹²⁵ The security situation in Iraq is a similar story.

The pattern of attempting to secure a country during the post-conflict phase with nowhere near enough troops to effectively accomplish the task was repeated in Iraq. The security situation in Iraq is still poor and continues to preoccupy the U.S. and coalition forces to the detriment of reconstruction, services, and good governance. The poor assumptions referenced above during planning initially contributed to the lack of security in “post-conflict” Iraq. Those assumptions were the belief that the Iraqis would hail the U.S. as a liberator, that the Iraqi government would somehow self-correct, and that the featherweight footprint of fewer troops armed with technology and significant lethality from ground and air platforms could effectively do the job.

¹²⁴ Pamela Constable, *Key Security Initiatives Founder in Afghanistan*, Washington Post, September 19, 2003.

¹²⁵ Milan Vaishnav, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 245.

However, there were two critically detrimental actions taken by L. Paul Bremer in 2003 that exacerbated the security problem then and still haunt the U.S. effort in 2007. The first was his “Order #1” issued on 15 May 2003 that directed the “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society.” This act disenfranchised more than 30,000 key and influential Iraqis, who were subsequently barred from government jobs.¹²⁶ The key U.S. Army War College meeting of experts in 2002 mentioned in planning above cautioned against the top-down “de-Baathification” directed by Bremer in 2003: “They recommended following the example of U.S. authorities in post-World War II Germany who used a bottom-up approach by having anti-Nazi Germans in every town review detailed questionnaires filled out by every adult German, and then determining, one by one, who would have their political and economic activities curtailed.”¹²⁷

The second critical decision by Bremer had an even greater and enduring negative effect on the security in post-conflict Iraq. It was his “Order # 2” that disbanded the Iraqi Army on 23 May 2003, and immediately disaffected and alienated some 300,000 Iraqi Soldiers.¹²⁸ Again, this was an act that was warned against by the various think tanks that met throughout 2002, and was done without consulting the key U.S. military leaders in Iraq as to the necessity and cascading effects such a decision would have in the country.¹²⁹ Bremer defends his decision as being sound based on the fear that the old Sunni-led army would potentially cause a civil war in the post-conflict era: “Any army that appeared to hand power back to a group of Sunni officers from the

¹²⁶ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 479

¹²⁷ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 479.

¹²⁸ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 483. The author experienced this alienation and disaffection first hand. We were engaging a former Iraqi general who had some 5,000 soldiers under his control. We were discussing the preliminary issues connected with calling them back up to go to work for the new government to help us establish security. Bremer’s misguided decision gave us 5,000 resistance fighters and their supporters on 24 May 2003. The first post-conflict casualty in our battalion from the insurgency occurred within the month.

¹²⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 483. Bathsheba Crocker in CSIS’s *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, refers to Bremer’s decision as one of the signal policy mistakes made regarding Iraq (see page 273).

old days would surely be rejected by the Kurds and Shi'a who made up 80 percent of Iraq's population. It was a recipe for civil war."¹³⁰ Bremer's point, shared by Rumsfeld, Feith and Slocombe, was accurate over time. However, many experts had warned throughout 2002 of the dangers of immediately and recklessly throwing 300,000 Iraqi soldiers out of work in the immediate post-conflict period, and had urged a gradual weeding-out process of the old army while simultaneously building a capable new army loyal to the new ideal of a democratic and ethnically mixed Iraq.¹³¹

Yet another negative effect resulting from the disbanding of the Iraqi army debacle was that we appeared to go back on our word. Much like we had done during the Invasion of Panama in 1989, the Iraqi army was urged in countless messages in various forms to not fight the U.S. and coalition forces because their fight was against Saddam and not the Iraqi people. Many Iraqi soldiers believed that if they abandoned their posts and did not fight, they would be reincorporated into the new army just as we had done with the former PDF in 1989. The act not only alienated and disaffected the 300,000 man army, but was viewed as an act of betrayal by a declared liberating army and a stain against the honor of those dismissed – a very problematic issue in the Arab culture of honor that is very much alive and well in Iraq.¹³²

In a recent report from the International Crisis Group, the authors highlighted the blunder of disbanding the Iraqi army and the resulting contribution to the lack of security in Iraq. The report also refutes the claim by Bremer that the largely Sunni army would provide a catalyst for sectarian violence if allowed to remain in existence:

“Along with de-Baathification, the issue that most rankled Iraqis in 2003 – regardless of sectarian identity – was the army's dismissal. It had not resisted the

¹³⁰ L.Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006) 56. Ironically his actions created a significant resistance or insurgent force and ultimately led to the current factional violence that looks a lot like a civil war. He probably published his memoirs too soon.

¹³¹ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 482.

¹³² Ibid.

U.S. military campaign to unseat the regime and indeed was not particularly known for its loyalty to Saddam Hussein and his entourage.”¹³³

Furthermore, the OSD team made the constant mistake of comparing post-conflict Iraq to post-World War II Germany and Japan. They believed that they had license to act as conquerors when in fact the Iraqis, to include the regular military, were led to believe that we came to liberate them from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. The old adage that “you can’t have it both ways” applies here. The OSD directed a very limited war against the Iraqi military, and then did not realize they therefore lacked the freedom of maneuver with the people to make heavy-handed decisions and dictate terms as if they were conquerors who had defeated a nation. This leads us to the issue of the psychology of defeat. The psychology of defeat or the lack of it in Iraq in the aftermath of the war in 2003 had a significant impact on the ability of the U.S. and the coalition to establish a secure environment.

As discussed in the introduction, Eva Bellin speaks of the sense of utter defeat and desperation that pervaded the German and Japanese societies following the immediate postwar period, creating a desire to break with the past and embrace something new.¹³⁴ The expectations the Germans and Japanese had of the Allies in 1945 were therefore not very high. The Allies were the conquerors and Germany and Japan were defeated nations who would be lucky to receive any help at all from their former enemies. They were just thankful it was over and the killing had stopped. This low expectation threshold contributed to a large degree of patience held by the Germans and the Japanese for years after the conflict. As mentioned in the first chapter, any serious misgivings by the people were directed at their own government and former military members rather than their occupiers. They knew that the bulk of the reconstruction work would have to come from within, and were willing to wait for the laborious process to bear fruit. By contrast, Bellin points out, Iraq did not experience the same shock of utter defeat of the nation

¹³³ International Crisis Group, *After Baker-Hamilton: What to do in Iraq* (Washington: Middle East Report No. 60, 19 December 2006), 19.

¹³⁴ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 601.

and resulting crisis even though the U.S. defeat of the Iraqi military was certainly irrefutable because the war was very short and the civilian casualties limited.¹³⁵ Afghanistan followed the same pattern of a short duration war that defeated the military and spared the civilian population.

However, the patience of the people in Afghanistan and Iraq was not anywhere close to being resilient because of the high expectations the people had of the “liberating” U.S. and coalition forces. As security failed to effectively materialize, and we failed to deliver expected improvements in infrastructure, services, and economic well being, their patience wore thin. The result has been a continuing decline in the security situation as more Afghans and Iraqis became disgusted with the lack of progress and began to withdraw support, both actively and passively, from the U.S. led efforts. As the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq have grown more disillusioned and hostile to U.S. efforts and presence in their countries, the insurgent and terrorist elements have been able to take advantage of the situation to recruit and foment more violence.

The results of a recent poll in Iraq aired on National Public Radio (NPR) on 27 September 2006 during an interview with NPR reporter Anne Garrels out of Baghdad: “Iraqis do not like the presence of American troops. And because of the lack of progress here be it the, you know, progress on infrastructure or security over the past three plus years, many Iraqis believe the U.S. wants to keep Iraq crippled. How, they ask, can the world super power have done so badly if it were not by intent.”¹³⁶ The author’s experience in Iraq from 2003 to 2004 supports this observation. During the fighting in April of 2003, many Iraqis turned out in the streets of one major city to warn U.S. soldiers of mines and booby traps set by the Saddam loyalists, even marking their positions with rocks to prevent us from driving over them. By August of 2003,

¹³⁵ Ibid, 602.

¹³⁶ Anne Garrels, *All Things Considered* radio hour on NPR, 27 September, 2006. See also the blog site www.riverbendblog.blogspot.com. It is posted by a woman in Baghdad who was educated in the West as a computer programmer. She began her postings in 2003, and they were very positive in their outlook on the U.S. – led invasion. She even expressed sympathy for U.S. soldiers who had to be away from their homes and in the heat and dust. Over the years, as we failed to deliver security and improvements, along with missteps and other signature failures in policy, her tone changed to one critical of our actions and lack of success.

those same Iraqis were digging up those mines to use them against us.¹³⁷ The lack of a psychology of defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan contributed to the establishment of a very short “half-life” described by LTG David H. Petraeus in which the U.S. “liberation” effort in both countries was pitted in a race against time to produce results and win the support of the populations before being viewed as a hated army of occupation.¹³⁸ The failure to establish a secure environment in Iraq and Afghanistan has had a catastrophic and persistent effect on the ability of the U.S. to successfully reconstruct those countries and transition them into working and effective democracies.¹³⁹

Afghanistan and Iraq both lacked traditions of good governance and effective state institutions and neither country has any recent experience with democracy. This deep lack of any sort of democratic tradition within these countries made the prospects for a quick and successful transition to effective democracy nearly impossible.¹⁴⁰ The troubles experienced by these budding democracies have only been exacerbated by the continuous and deteriorating security conditions in both countries. The central governments of both countries are seen by their citizens to be wracked with factional divides and corruption, and incapable of providing services, security, and law within their own borders. Despite the much lauded elections held in Iraq that seemed to hold

¹³⁷ A poll conducted in September of 2006 for WorldPublicOpinion.org by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland reflected that 82 percent of Shiite Arabs and 97 percent of Sunni Arabs believe that the U.S. military in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is preventing. The same poll reflected that 71 percent of Iraqis desire their government to ask the U.S. military to leave Iraq within a year. The results of this poll were featured in a National Public Radio broadcast of “All Things Considered” on 27 September 2006. The entire poll results can be found at <http://worldpublicopinion.org>.

¹³⁸ “The liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation. The length of this half-life is tied to the perceptions of that populace about the impact of the liberating force’s activities. From the moment a force enters a country; its leaders must keep this in mind, striving to meet the expectations of the liberated in what becomes a race against the clock.” (See footnote 32)

¹³⁹ Every book or article about counterinsurgency the author has read for self education and for the research for this study, to include the recently (December, 2006) published U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24), consistently point out the importance of establishing and maintaining security in any post-conflict scenario where insurgency is possible or active. Everything hinges on security. There can be no reconstruction or effective governance without effective security.

¹⁴⁰ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 599-600.

so much promise, the International Crisis Group was a bit more critical in its December, 2006 report:

“The political system and constitution have proved to be self-defeating, in the sense that they have increased the likelihood that what is left of the state will collapse. The U.S. has under the most favorable interpretation, acted as an impotent bystander, waving signs of progress as evidence that the country was moving toward participatory democracy even as it was descending into an inferno of sectarian violence and lawlessness.”¹⁴¹

Neither country possessed leaders of national stature who were universally respected and accepted and who could step up to the plate to lead their nations into democracy. Afghanistan’s Hamid Kharzai certainly appears to fit the role, but in the heavily factional tribal and ethnic reality that is Afghanistan, he only appeals to a small portion of that nation’s people.

Ethnic homogeneity is another contributor to success in forced democracy where the fractious nature of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq create significant difficulties. Both regions have long histories of violent ethnic, religious and tribal divisions that were both rekindled by the power and security vacuum created as a result of war and the destruction of the military in the respective countries. The anorexic presence of U.S. and coalition forces on the ground in both countries was insufficient to fill that vacuum and prevent the fault lines from erupting.¹⁴²

Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq possessed the level of economic development that Bellin points out as a necessary precursor for imposed democracy.¹⁴³ Without a pre-existing robust economy based on an advanced level of economic development, the level of economic and social well being envisioned by Orr as one of the pillars for successful post conflict reconstruction can not occur.¹⁴⁴ Recall from the introduction chapter Bellin’s point that although economic development is not a necessary or sufficient condition for the transition to democracy, it is

¹⁴¹ International Crisis Group, *After Baker-Hamilton: What to do in Iraq* (Washington: Middle East Report No. 60, 19 December 2006), 19.

¹⁴² Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 598

¹⁴³ Ibid, 596-597.

necessary for democracy to endure.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, owing in part to the poor security conditions in Iraq, the corruption of the fledgling government, and the incompetence of U.S. contractors, the water, power and sanitation conditions along with other services in post-conflict Iraq remained at or below pre-war status, and has yet to receive significant improvements.¹⁴⁶ Average Afghanis and Iraqis were unable to see, feel, and believe they had experienced an increase in their social and economic well-being. This was undoubtedly a critical factor in reducing support for the democratic central government in both countries while offering an avenue for recruitment by or at least support of the enemy.

The analysis of justice and reconciliation in Afghanistan and Iraq is difficult. Although much work has been done to build the rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan over the years, the lack of security, poor law enforcement and unreliable police, ethnic divides, tribal traditions and law, and the natural incompatibilities between a democratic legal process and Islamic law have been highly problematic.¹⁴⁷ The trials, convictions and recent executions of Saddam Hussein and two of his advisors (henchmen?) were painfully indicative of the inadequate progress made so far in Iraq. The trials were fraught with difficulties and inconsistencies – not the least of which was the security of witnesses and lawyers. The execution of Hussein as seen on the news and in the papers portrayed the unpleasant image of a vengeful sectarian lynching rather than the objective and impartial actions of a legitimate government.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, the December, 2006 report by the International Crisis Group points to the additional need of a transitional justice mechanism that is designed to separate persons culpable of specific crimes from those who merely offered the regime their support or lip service. This need was not present in 2003 when the de-Baathification

¹⁴⁴Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 10-11.

¹⁴⁵Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 597.

¹⁴⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 279-281.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 277-278.

¹⁴⁸ Robert Malley, Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq, Washington D.C, 23 January 2007. Transcript available through the International Crisis Group at www.crisisgroup.org.

process cast an overly large net, and has yet to be met as a means for equitably resolving justice and reconciliation without further alienating elements of Iraqi society.¹⁴⁹

The level of U.S. commitment in Iraq in terms of national elements of power and resources beyond the military is significantly limited in comparison to its commitment to defeat Germany and Japan during World War II and then impose democracy in those defeated nations after the war. Bellin describes the level of U.S. commitment in Iraq as “slim” and further states,

“We are rhetorically committed to democratization in Iraq, but the pairing of this ideal to our realpolitik interests in the country is much more tenuous. Our meager engagement in Iraq’s democratization is reflected in the measure of resources we are willing to devote to this venture, most notably, in terms of time.”¹⁵⁰

U.S. impatience and its resulting lack of willingness to invest the time required for success is not the only demonstration of poor commitment. Analysis of the research shows that many other key resources are lacking as well. Money, manpower and industry have not been committed beyond the rhetorical. The old sport adage that everyone has a desire to win, but not everyone has the will to win is applicable here. The U.S. has failed to back up its desire with the appropriate resources necessary to be representative of its will to succeed.

Although the significant amount of money spent in Iraq and Afghanistan appears in the news and in political discussions, is it really a sure sign of U.S. commitment? According to the U.S. Government’s Office of Management and Budget, the U.S. spent 37 percent of its GDP on military spending in 1943, 37.8 percent in 1944, and 37.5 percent in 1945. Only 3.7 percent of the U.S. GDP was dedicated to military spending in 2003, and was not projected to increase beyond 4 percent through 2007.¹⁵¹ The U.S. has also chosen not to mobilize its manpower and industry in order to produce the amount of “boots on the ground” and requisite equipment ostensibly required to sustain the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq while maintaining the reserves necessary to

¹⁴⁹ International Crisis Group, *After Baker-Hamilton: What to do in Iraq* (Washington: Middle East Report No. 60, 19 December 2006), 20..

¹⁵⁰ Eva Bellin, *The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective*, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4, 2004-2005), 602.

¹⁵¹ United States Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005) 45-52.

maintain strategic flexibility and a credible deterrent to other “bad actors” around the globe.¹⁵²

Although the diplomatic element of national power has been working overtime during the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq to generate global support for the U.S. venture, the level of multilateral participation varies between the two theaters of war. Whereas the traditional U.S. allies and its NATO partners supported the actions of the U.S. in Afghanistan for the most part, as evidenced by the significant NATO military commitment there, the U.S. failed to garner the same level of support for its venture into Iraq.¹⁵³ The U.S. has not enjoyed the same level of diplomatic, economic, and military support in Iraq that it has in Afghanistan. NATO has become heavily involved in Afghanistan, allowing the U.S. to reduce its military presence there, yet the amount of U.S. friends and allies willing to commit troops to Iraq have remained comparatively slim.

The analysis of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is not positive. The U.S. achieved only one of the seven evaluation criteria in the form of its multilateral approach and support. Although NATO provided forces and assumed the mission in Afghanistan under NATO command, that mission is still handicapped by the continued lack of security necessary for reconstruction and governance. It is a condition NATO inherited from the U.S. because the U.S. failed to adequately plan for and provide the necessary resources for establishing sufficient security following the defeat of the Taliban regime.

The analysis of the situation in Iraq is bleaker. The U.S. failed to meet any of the seven evaluation criteria with any degree of success. The U.S. failed to commit sufficient forces in Iraq to ensure post-conflict security, and the policies of disbanding the army and de-Baathification further served to exacerbate the poor security situation.

¹⁵² United States Army, FM 3-24 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (Washington: Government printing Office, 15 December 2006) 1-13. This new Army publication draws from several sources to recommend the amount of security forces needed in a counterinsurgency campaign to successfully provide security while combating the insurgent. The manual establishes the historical precedent for a requirement of a ratio of one counterinsurgent for every fifty residents for a successful counterinsurgent campaign.

Both countries continue to experience a significant lack of the security necessary for reconstruction, economic improvement, rule of law, and good governance. As stated in the introduction chapter, security is the most important criteria for success in imposing democracy – particularly in the absence of total war. The continuing violence in both countries has been the most critical factor in denying the U.S. the success it desires. This violence is a direct result of the U.S.’s failure to establish a secure environment in either country. The failure to establish security in Afghanistan and Iraq is rooted in the flawed plans for military operations in both countries that were based on faulty assumptions, incomplete analysis, failure to sufficiently integrate other elements of national power besides the military, and the lack of significant commitment by the U.S to provide the resources necessary to establish effective security.

IV. Conclusion

The U.S. can impose democracy on an undemocratic nation without resorting to total war. However, the U.S. can only do so if it is willing to commit the resources necessary to establish effective security in the post-conflict environment. Analysis of the case studies shows that the resources required become a matter of scale. Relatively “small” operations or “limited wars” such as Grenada and Panama sit on the left end of the spectrum. They require a minimal amount of national resources short of total war in order to effectively establish a secure post-conflict environment. Wars with peer nations such as Germany and Japan in World War II – total war - sit on the far right end of the spectrum. Such wars require a significant amount of national commitment and resources in order to defeat the nations and establish a secure post-conflict environment that permits the democratic transformation process.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005), 250-258, 282-283.

¹⁵⁴ Another discovery that occurred as a result of the research for this study was the concept of national culpability. It was very clear that during the Second World War and in its aftermath, the U.S. held the populations of Germany and Japan directly responsible for the actions of their respective nations. On the other hand, the U.S. did not hold the populations of Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq responsible for the actions of their governments. This degree of national culpability seemed to effect the commitment of resources and the level of intensity with which the U.S. prosecuted war and post-conflict operations in

Research for this study suggests that the Bush administration and plenty of senior level military leaders believed that the level of national commitment and resources required to impose democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq fell somewhere just to the right of Grenada and Panama on the spectrum. The current conditions in both countries show that they were wrong. The scale of the task at hand of providing adequate post-conflict security in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that the U.S. should have considered that the level of commitment and resources required fell somewhere just to the left of total war.

Security is the paramount element that must exist in a post-conflict environment. Analysis of the case studies clearly shows that success hinges on the ability of the U.S. to provide that security. No other reconstruction or democratic efforts can succeed unless there is first a secure environment for those initiatives to gain traction and endure.

The U.S. was able to provide a secure environment in post-war Germany and Japan because it had the forces on the ground to ensure it. The security effort was enhanced by the significant psychology of defeat as a result of total war experienced by the German and Japanese people. All other aspects of reconstruction and transformation to democracy were enabled by the secure environment. The process in both countries was able to continue for decades after capitulation without interruption or degradation from violence.

Security was the guarantor of success in Grenada and Panama too. Its effect overshadowed any shortcomings in planning or commitment of resources beyond the security effort. The popular support of the Grenadine and Panamanian people certainly influenced the security effort, but the secure post-conflict environment in both countries was directly responsible for successfully imposing democracy without requiring total war.

the case studies. The research for this study confirms that Grenada and Panama deserved the very low degree of national culpability with which they were regarded by the U.S. Is it possible that the people of Afghanistan and Iraq deserved some degree of national culpability that was greater than that of Grenada and Panama, but somewhat less than that of World War II Germany and Japan? The answer to this question could conceivably constitute a research paper itself.

The U.S. never established secure post-conflict environments in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was due to poor planning based on flawed assumptions and analysis, the failure to commit the resources necessary to establish security, and the signal policy errors in Iraq of disbanding the military and de-Baathification. The lack of security in both countries persists and preoccupies U.S. efforts as its leaders continue to presume that they can achieve success “on the cheap” by failing to apply the required resources. As a result, the reconstruction and democratic transformation of both countries have been incomplete, ineffective, and fatally slow as the U.S. seems to be losing the battle against time.

The final analysis of the case studies shows that the evaluation criteria are not entirely valid and require an adjustment. The primary source for the evaluation criteria for this study comes from Robert Orr in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*.¹⁵⁵ Orr lists four pillars for post-conflict reconstruction: security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. Those four pillars form the core of the evaluation criteria for this monograph. However, the research for this study shows that security is not merely one of several pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. Security is actually the *foundation* for the post-conflict reconstruction effort upon which all other pillars must anchor in order to have success.¹⁵⁶ All other elements of the evaluation criteria are necessary for success in imposing democracy, but they are not sufficient. Only security is the element that is both necessary *and* sufficient.

This does not mean that the other elements of reconstruction must be addressed in a sequential fashion while waiting for the establishment of security. The other elements of post-conflict reconstruction can begin as separate lines of operation while the foundation of post-

¹⁵⁵ Center for Strategic and International Studies, edited by Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: the CSIS Press, 2005). He outlines his four pillars of reconstruction in the first chapter, and the majority of the book expounds on each of the pillars.

¹⁵⁶ In fairness to Robert Orr, he does describe security as the most important pillar of the four he lists, but nonetheless describes it as one of four pillars rather than as a necessary *and* sufficient element.

conflict security solidifies, but they will not ultimately bear fruit and endure until there is an effective secure environment.

The U.S. can impose democracy in the absence of total war, but it can only do so by committing the resources necessary to establish the foundation of a secure post-conflict environment that enables reconstruction and transformation. Strategic leaders and planners - particularly senior level civilians- must accomplish this by developing a plan that is rooted in realistic and objective analysis of the problem. They must avoid oversimplified comparisons to past operations and experiences that lead to flawed templates. The analysis may result in requiring resources well beyond what a given administration is willing to politically ask of the American public. Our leaders must then resist the temptation to ignore the results of objective analysis by attempting to apply limited and politically acceptable resources to a war that clearly requires a much more significant commitment. Afghanistan and Iraq are unfortunate and continuing examples of what happens when the U.S. attempts to wage war on the cheap by applying limited means to a problem that requires the resources of a nation at war. The price paid in blood, treasure, and prestige by failing to commit the resources necessary for establishing effective security when imposing democracy is not cheap at all. The cost has been much too high.

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